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Political chimeras
The uncertainty of the chief ’s speech 
in the Upper Xingu
Antonio Guerreiro, University of Campinas
This article deals with the issue of ritual polities in Southern Amazon, and in particular the 
case of “chieftaincy without power.” Through the analysis of ritual oratory among chiefs in 
the multiethnic and multilingual system of the Upper Xingu, it considers how the concepts 
of “ritual condensation” and “chimera” could be useful for the description and analysis 
of such polities. In the Upper Xingu, certain chiefs are fluent in a verbal genre known as 
“chiefs’ talk,” composed of formalized speeches directed either to leaders of other groups 
or to their own people, depending on the context in which they are delivered. Analyzing 
discourses of the latter kind among the Kalapalo (a Karib-speaking people of the region), 
the article shows how both the chief and his audience are symbolically constructed as 
“paradoxical” subjects characterized by contradictory predicates, and discusses how this 
is related to Kalapalo ideas on kinship and power. By engaging with the concepts of “ritual 
condensation” and “chimera,” the article resumes the debate on political oratory generated 
by Pierre Clastres and investigates how uncertainty—rather than “authority” or “belief ”—
can enact an exchange of perspectives through which the identities of the group and the 
chief are produced.
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The typical image of Amerindian chieftaincy that appears throughout Pierre Clas-
tres’ work is quite well known: the chief should be someone generous with his 
goods, from whom society expects a great oratory capacity, and who also enjoys 
the privilege of polygamy.1 From a gift-theory perspective, he would be a donator of 
1. This article is based on a lecture given in October 2012 at Quartas Indomáveis, a 
monthly event held by the Post-Graduation Program in Social Anthropology of the 
Federal University of São Carlos (UFSCar). I would like to thank Marcos Lanna for 
the invitation, and all those who attended for the valuable questions and suggestions. 
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goods and words, and a receiver of spouses. Yet, one of Clastres’ main arguments is 
that the bond between the chief and the group is only apparently an exchange rela-
tionship. To the contrary, he suggests that these gifts would be excluded from their 
specific exchange circuits, and goods and words could never count as retributions 
for the women the chief receives from the group. The gifts that circulate from the 
chief to the group (goods and words), or from the group to the chief (wives), would 
always follow a unilateral direction, and would never be compensated.
The chieftaincy would, as such, be a place of “nonexchange” (Lanna 2005: 427), 
in which signs are deprived of their circulation value and reciprocity is denied un-
der the demand that society make visible the foundations of power (a break with 
the structures of reciprocity that tie social life together), maintaining them under 
the control of the collective body. The chieftaincy, excluded from the main circuits 
of exchange that structure social life, would thus be transformed into an empty 
function, and power would be deprived of a means of being put to use. Primitive 
society, placed in the creditor position of its chiefs, would imprison power and as-
sume control of the place where it could emerge—it would be a society against the 
state (Clastres 1990b).
In the multiethnic and multilingual complex of the Upper Xingu (Southern 
Amazon), ritual sponsoring accounts for both the production of chieftaincy and 
social life at the local level, and the articulation of a large, multicentric, regional 
network of persons and groups. This open-ended regional system can be consid-
ered a “ritual polity,” in which public rituals are the main motor of collective life. 
Most of the qualities attributed to chiefs are linked to their participation in such rit-
uals, which, via several artistic means (such as music, bodily painting, verbal arts), 
make the chiefly condition “visible.” By being endowed with a conventional form 
(an aesthetics), chieftaincy is also endowed with its proper efficacy. Politics is art.
How is the idea of chieftaincy produced and transmitted in ritual? Houseman 
and Severi (1998) have argued that ritual actions have a common characteristic, 
which they call “ritual condensation.” According to Houseman (2004: 76), ritual 
condensation is “the simultaneous enactment of nominally contrary modes of re-
lationship: affirmations of identity are at the same time testimonies of difference, 
displays of authority are also demonstrations of subordination, the presence of 
persons or other beings is at once corroborated and denied, secrets are simulta-
neously dissimulated and revealed, and so forth.” This combination of contradic-
tions creates a distinctive context of communication, in which the very conditions 
of ritual efficacy are generated. Applying these ideas to the analysis of different 
iconographic traditions, Severi (2015) developed the concept of “chimera,” which 
proved a useful means of understanding the ritual efficacy of images and objects, 
their relation to mnemonic technologies, and the relations between images and 
words. Could the production of ritual images also play a role in indigenous modes 
of understanding power and dealing with it? Could these concepts be useful for 
I thank Bruna Franchetto and Mara Santos for our conversations on Xinguano ritu-
als, and their invaluable help with the Kalapalo language. Comments and suggestions 
by the anonymous reviewers and the journal’s editor, Giovanni da Col, were also very 
helpful.
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understanding Amerindian politics in particular, and maybe the relations between 
ritual and politics in other cases?
For Severi (2013: 45), one could call a chimera “every image that, by designat-
ing a plural being by means of a single representation, mobilizes its invisible parts, 
by purely optical means or by a set of inferences.” A chimerical image associates, 
in a single visual form, “indexes from different beings (a bird and a human be-
ing, a serpent and a jaguar, a wolf and a sea lion . . .),” provoking “a projection by 
the eye, which gives rise to an image implying at the same time the presence of 
these different beings” (Severi and Lagrou 2013: 11). What is presented to the ob-
server necessarily evokes something that is implicit or absent. From a logical point 
of view, chimerical images present a “specific link between iconic representation 
(by imitation and convention) and indexical indication (visual, tactile or other) of 
a presence whose mode of existence, especially mental, is not realized materially” 
(Severi 2013: 46).
This peculiar game between perception and projection, iconic representation 
and indexical indication, is responsible for an intensification of the efficacy of chi-
meric images. By capturing the observer’s eye, they also capture his or her imagi-
nation, and demand that he or she, by projection, mentally “complete” the image. 
According to Peirce (1955), indexical signs have a causal, or spatiotemporal, conti-
guity with what they signify. Thus, the missing parts of a chimeric image mentally 
projected by the observer are also made present in the context of its perception.
In a recent book on chimeras in Amazonia, Severi and Lagrou call attention to 
the “synesthetic” character of the relation between different artistic means in in-
terlinked contexts of ritual action and artistic creation. They argue that “relations, 
correspondences and transformations between music, rhythm, movement and gra-
phism” appear to be especially relevant in Amerindian ritual contexts (Severi and 
Lagrou 2013: 12). Taking this argument as a point of departure, I would like to 
explore the possibility of thinking about Xinguano images of chieftaincy, as they 
are produced through ritual action, as a kind of chimeric image—not, though, as 
an exclusively (and not even mainly) visual one, but as a “mental image” produced 
by the combination of linguistic and extralinguistic media in ritual performance 
(Severi 2015: 201). According to Michael Silverstein (2003: 15), the combining of 
indexical signs in communication acts produces “a kind of poetry of identities-in-
motion,” capable of projecting complex images of a nonvisual kind. In his words, 
“image is not necessarily visual; it is an abstract portrait of identity fashioned out of 
cumulating patterns of congruence across all manner of indexical signs—including 
visual ones—that addressees and audiences can imaginatively experience, like a 
hologram.” It is in this sense that I propose to discuss Kalapalo political oratory as 
presenting a certain “image” of Xinguano chieftaincy.
If chimerical representation is an “art of ambiguity” (Severi and Lagrou 
2013: 14), it could be related to a classic issue of Amazonian ethnology: the “dual-
ism in perpetual disequilibrium” discussed by Lévi-Strauss (1991) in The story of 
Lynx, which may account for the “pendular movement” of Amerindian politics, 
combining centripetal forces of centralization with centrifugal forces of dispersion 
(Perrone-Moisés 2012). Taking forward Severi and Lagrou’s proposal of identifying 
the forms that chimeras may assume by combining different aesthetic resources, 
this concept could help us to understand the complex relations between hierarchy 
2015 | Hau: Journal of Ethnographic Theory 5 (1): 59–85
Antonio Guerreiro 62
and counterhierarchy, power and counterpower, in the so-called “societies against 
the state,” such as made perceptible/comprehensible by indigenous knowledge 
practices. I also intend to suggest how Kalapalo ritual speeches could be compared 
to other forms of political oratory. As Silverstein (2003, 2005) discusses, the mark 
of political oratory, modern and nonmodern, is not necessarily the conveyance of 
“meaning,” but the relation between poetics and the production of identities. I hope 
this comparison can be seen as an effort to produce a more symmetrical under-
standing of Amerindian politics in relation to other political forms.
Language, politics, and ritual
Language has a special place among the three exchange circuits explored by Clas-
tres. He notes that “talent as a speaker is both a condition and instrument of politi-
cal power” (Clastres 1990c: 31), and “it would seem, then, that power and speech 
cannot be conceived of separately, since their clearly metahistorical bond is no 
less indissoluble in primitive societies than in formations with a State” (Clastres 
1990a: 152). The difference is that in state societies the word would be a right to 
power that may be used to command, while in societies against the state the word 
would be a duty of the chief (ibid.: 153; 1990c: 41): an indigenous leader must be 
capable of offering society the words that it demands.
According to Clastres, the chief ’s speech, despite being demanded by society, 
would be directed toward an audience that has neither the obligation, nor even the 
interest, to hear it or respond to it: the Amerindian chief “is a voice preaching in 
the wilderness” (Clastres 1990c: 31), since his speech “is not spoken in order to be 
listened to” (Clastres 1990a: 153). The chief also wouldn’t say anything that is really 
worth hearing anyway, “since the chief, for all his prolixity, literally says nothing. 
His discourse basically consists of a celebration, repeated many times, of the norms 
of traditional life” (ibid.). Limiting himself to exalting the community to live ac-
cording to correct ancestral customs, the chief ’s speech would only be a repetition 
of what Clastres (1990c: 31) calls “edifying discourse.” In the same way that the 
lack of reciprocity in the field of goods and women would cause them to lose their 
exchange value, the chief ’s words would be deviated from the “function of com-
munication that is immanent to language” (ibid.: 46). Deprived of this function, the 
chief ’s speech is transformed into pure value and, “in its solitude, recalls the speech 
of a poet for whom words are values before they are signs” (ibid.: 47). Clastres also 
defines language as the inverse of one of the most striking facets of coercive power: 
violence. A man who has the privilege of speaking to others, who are obliged to 
hear him out, is endowed with the power to coerce, while he who must speak to an 
“anti-audience,” is deprived of this possibility: “The duty of the chief ’s speech, that 
steady flow of empty speech that he owes the tribe, is his infinite debt, the guarantee 
that prevents the man of speech becoming a man of power” (Clastres 1990a: 155).
Clastres asks himself: “What does the chief say? What is the word of a chief 
like?” (ibid.: 153). He argues it is a “ritualized act,” instead of an act of communica-
tion. Is Clastres suggesting that ritual action doesn’t communicate anything? Or, 
still, might language not be used as a mode of action, contrary to literature on ritual 
language as well as pragmatics (Austin 1975; Tambiah 1985; Silverstein 1997)? As 
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Magnus Course says, Clastres’ model “presupposes an understanding of language 
as primarily ‘symbolic’ and in which speech is firmly rooted in its speaker’s in-
tention, a model rooted in Western, not Amerindian, language ideology” (Course 
2012: 20). Focusing on the referential or denotative function of language, Clastres’ 
perspective leaves aside its pragmatic aspects, that is, elements of enunciation (oral 
or not) that may produce effects on the enunciator as well as on his or her audience 
(Silverstein 1997).
Silverstein (2005: 1) argues that what is called politics, “the dynamic arrange-
ment and rearrangement of people as subjects within structures of actual and poten-
tial action of all sorts,” always comprises a poetics, because everything experienced 
as effective “practice” is formed semiotically—that is, through signs. As he states, 
“political events . . . reach whatever effectiveness they have only in a semiotic—a 
sign-mediated—order or they don’t reach any effectiveness at all qua sociocultural 
fact” (ibid.: 3). Conversely, communication forms are also able to “create social ar-
rangements as consequences of using these forms” (Silverstein 2003: 10–11). Politi-
cal oratory, rather than “informing” the “content” of a message, would use poetical 
resources that allow interlocutors to have their identities mutually constructed by 
means of indexical signs that connect the message’s form to extralinguistic contex-
tual facts. It would be possible, in this way, to “inhabit” a message: “a really power-
ful ‘message’ ascribes to me—as opposed to describes—my reality” (ibid.: 16).
If, as Clastres notes, the chief ’s speech is a “ritualized act,” it should be treated as 
such. The first step in doing so is assuming that its referential meaning must be un-
derstood in relation to other functions characterizing ritual oratory. The symbolic 
procedures that separate ritual speech from ordinary interactions are not necessar-
ily intended to “mean something,” but—as Malinowski ([1935] 2002) had already 
noticed in relation to Trobriand magic—to do something. As Severi (2004: 816) 
suggests, when we focus on ritual speech acts, it is necessary “to reconstruct the 
pragmatic conditions that define the kind of ‘language game’ in which they are 
used.” In his study on political oratory, Bloch (1975: 22) argues that formalization 
(the reduction of combinatory and creative possibilities of language by the use of 
formulas, archaic vocabulary, syntactic and stylistic patterns), by distancing the 
discourse from its semantic content, draws attention to its context and perfor-
mance, endowing the speech with the capacity of producing effects.
There are plenty of works discussing ritual speech in indigenous South 
America (Graham 1986; Urban 1986; McCallum 1990; Gow 1991; Santos-Granero 
1991; Belaunde 1992; Franchetto 1993; Farage 1997; Passes 1998; Beier, Michael, 
and Sherzer 2002; Rubio 2004; Ball 2007), and it would be impossible to review 
all of them here. However, it’s important to note that certain authors claim that 
Amerindian chiefs’ speech has, through its aesthetic and moral dimension, a politi-
cally relevant role in the production of sociality. As Cecilia McCallum (1990: 416) 
says about the Kaxinawa, a leader’s speech “can be understood as a force in the 
production of persons, on the one hand, and of communities, on the other.”
But how is the meaning of a supposedly meaningless speech created, and what 
role could it play in social relations? According to Severi (2002: 28), ritual action 
usually focuses on what he calls “reflexivity,” or the “definition of its own meaning 
and effectiveness within the context of ritual communication.” In this sense, we 
should investigate how the chief ’s speech produces its own context and meanings, 
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and how its “efficacy” could be generated in such conditions of action, and not by 
external causes (such as “authority,” “‘morality,” or the “refusal of the state”). In 
what follows, I will analyze a set of two pieces of ritual oratory among the Kalapalo. 
By analyzing elements of its performative and poetic structure, I will demonstrate 
how these oral performances simultaneously construct an image of the chief as a 
“consanguine kin” and a potentially dangerous enemy/affine, and how the identi-
fication of his fellows both as his children and as his prey could be related to the 
production of kinship.
According to Houseman and Severi (1998), one of the clues for understand-
ing ritual communication is to analyze how ritual defines a special form of inter-
action, characterized by ritual condensation, by means of which the identities of 
the participants are constructed. The intentional contradictions frequently used 
in ritual speech create what Severi (2004) calls a “complex enunciator,” someone 
whose identity is defined by contradictory predicates. The Kalapalo chiefs seem to 
be enunciators of this kind. In the Kalapalo case we find a “paradox,” two contra-
dictory statements related by a logical link, such as: “As I am your enemy and af-
fine, I am your protector and consanguine.” My intention is to understand both the 
ontological ground that demands such paradoxical construction of identities, and 
how it is symbolically achieved by the ritual use of language. I argue that, instead 
of relying on external notions of “authority,” “consensus,” or “reciprocity,” as some 
visions of political oratory suggest (see Bloch 1975), the key for understanding the 
chief ’s speech is its own ambiguity, and that the duality generated by gestural and 
verbal aspects of such performances indeed imposes an exchange between speak-
er and addressee—not of words, in Clastres’ sense, but of perspectives—through 
which their identities emerge. Such ritual performances involve the perception of 
fragmentary signs that suggest the presence of their counterparts to the hearers, as 
in a chimerical representation: when the chief speaks as a consanguine/father, his 
performance “points to” (indexes) an occult affine/enemy quality; when the signs 
of his alterity/enmity become visible, they index his conditions of father/protector. 
This alternation makes chieftaincy effective to different observers, bringing either 
hierarchy or symmetry to the foreground. This, I suggest, would allow us to talk 
about “political chimeras” in the Xinguano context, and possibly elsewhere.
Akitsene: The chiefs’ ritual oratory
The Upper Xingu is a multiethnic and multilingual society, articulated by the cir-
culation of people, objects, and participation in regional rituals. This sociocultural 
complex is made up of ten peoples, who speak languages pertaining to different lin-
guistic branches and families, located at the south of the Indigenous Park of Xingu, 
in Midwestern Brazil. There live Arawak (Mehináku, Wauja, and Yawalapíti), 
Karib2 (Kalapalo, Kuikuro, Matipu, and Nahukwá), and Tupi (Kamayurá and 
Aweti) speakers, besides the Trumái, who speak an isolated language. The Kalapalo 
population reaches almost seven hundred people distributed mainly in ten villages, 
2. All Karib words used in this article have been written according to the orthography 
developed by Bruna Franchetto together with indigenous teachers.
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almost all of which located along the course of the Culuene River, the main affluent 
of the Xingu River.
The Kalapalo refer to certain men and women as anetü and itankgo, “male chief ” 
and “female chief,” respectively, and equivalent terms exist among all groups in the 
region. It is a condition simultaneously inherited and developed throughout life: it 
is not enough to be the son or grandson of an anetü in order to be one as well, but 
rather one must develop a beautiful and strong body, serene and generous behavior, 
and linguistic abilities. Chiefs are the objects of intense mythical, aesthetic, and 
ritual elaboration, but they have no power to command and are described as hav-
ing two great responsibilities: on the one hand, they must take care of their people, 
guiding them with “good speech,” feeding them, and pleasing them by sponsoring 
rituals; on the other, they must welcome messengers from other peoples and con-
duct their group to rituals sponsored by other villages.
Both of these activities demand ritual uses of speech, which, as has been widely 
observed, is one of the main characteristics of the chiefly condition (Basso 1973: 
135; Viveiros de Castro 1977: 218; Franchetto 1986, 1993, 2000; Ball 2007). Certain 
oral anetü performances are part of a “singing speech” style known as anetü itagi-
nhu, “chiefs’ speech” or “chiefs’ talk,” a formal genre characterized by the successive 
chanting of monotone lines organized according to a parallelistic style (Franchetto 
2000). There are different sets of discourses appropriate for each situation, with 
diversified contents, and they employ specific vocabularies and stylistic resources.
This speech genre is marked by the use of a “figurative, metaphorical, and eru-
dite language that is typical of a very special register and restricted to few special-
ists” (Franchetto 1986: 365). The Kalapalo say that many words and expressions 
used in the anetü itaginhu are “ancients’ language” (ngiholo akisü) or “chiefs’ lan-
guage” (anetü akisü), and as such are not fully understood by people who do not 
know it. The use of such formal style would confirm the tie between those speaking 
it—living chiefs—and earlier anetü, to whom they are considered as substitutes 
(itüpohongo). Bruna Franchetto (1986: 366) observes that a chief ’s interest in learn-
ing the anetü itaginhu “is the consequence of a conscientious intention to achieve 
and guarantee the recognition of power and cohesion of their domestic group and 
allies. The apprentice makes explicit his determination to perpetuate a tradition 
that ties him to the chieftaincy’s lineage.”
It’s possible to divide Kalapalo ritual speeches into two groups: those delivered to 
foreigners, and those delivered to fellow villagers. In the first case are those groups 
of discourses used in each regional ritual, designated by the name of the ritual fol-
lowed by the nominal word itagimbakitoho (“made in order to greet”), such as, for 
example, egitsü3 itagimbakitoho (“made in order to greet in egitsü”). There are also 
discourses used to receive messengers from other villages, called etinhü itagimbaki-
toho (“made in order to greet messengers”), that present variations according to the 
ritual for which the village has been invited.
In the second group (speeches for fellow villagers—akitsene, in Kalapalo), may 
be found what Franchetto calls “political oratory,” a nonceremonial public speech 
tied to village politics, which may only be pronounced by chiefs and elders. This 
kind of oratory deals with events in the life of the village, and the speaker “constructs 
3. A feast in homage to deceased chiefs, known as “Quarup” (see Guerreiro 2012).
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his discourse by taking advantage of a relative creativity in order to advance his 
own proposals in a particular context” (Franchetto 1986: 378). In consequence, 
“the language of this oratory is less differentiated from common registries than the 
ceremonial language” (ibid.: 382), and the fact that it is less ritualized is made evi-
dent by the prolongation of verses and the reduction of parallelisms and repetition.
At least among the Kalapalo, there are also two formal speeches that may be 
framed in the subgenre of political oratory, yet are more formalized and their ex-
ecution is restricted to great chiefs. Their content is fixed and their form constant, 
approximating them to the itagimbakitoho, and it is these two speeches that will be 
discussed in this article.
In the village of Aiha, Ageu is the only chief familiar with these speeches. He 
learned them from his father, but never actually delivered them in public. The 
Kalapalo say that in the last few decades these speeches have been used by fewer 
chiefs, and seem to be disappearing from all villages. In Aiha, it is said that they 
have not been heard since the 1980s. This absence does not bother the Kalapalo 
too much, but they do think it is a sign that they may be “becoming white” (I will 
return to this point later).
These discourses are associated with two animals considered as their “owners,” 
a kind of small hawk (ugonhi, or kakahuẽgü) and the jaguar4 (ekege). Ugonhi is, 
together with other birds of prey (among which the most important is the harpy), 
the bird chief, while the jaguar is the head chief of land-based animals. Both occupy 
these positions because of their hunting skills, since any chief is, when among other 
peoples, represented as a beast of prey and a potential enemy. The speeches form an 
ordered (tinapisinhü) group, in which the hawk’s speech is considered as the “first” 
(ihotugu; lit. point, prow, beak), and the jaguar’s discourse “second” (isotohongo; lit. 
“its other equal”).
I documented the versions transcribed here together with Ageu, while he was 
teaching them to his maternal nephew. The transcriptions and translations were 
made together with a group of different Kalapalo collaborators.5
Ugonhi akitsu: The Hawk’s Speech
The Hawk’s Speech should be pronounced before dawn. This is when the ugonhi 
wakes up and starts singing—that is, proffering his speech, since what humans per-
ceive as bird chanting is actually the hawk-chief ’s speech according to the birds’ 
point of view. The chief must deliver this speech in the center of the village, standing 
up and with his body facing east. He doesn’t need any adornment, but if he wishes 
he may use his akitsoho (“made to discourse”), a set consisting of a bow and arrow 
worn by chiefs when they appear in public in rituals and deliver speeches. The bow 
should be a majahi, the largest and most resistant bow in the Upper Xingu; the ar-
row should be a “winged arrow,” with a hawk feather and a scarlet macaw feather. 
4. According to a female chief, this discourse is “owned” by Enitsuẽgü, the jaguar-father 
of the twins who created humanity.
5. I would especially like to thank Ugise, Teue, Orlandinho, and Kayauta for their help.
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These instruments are indexes of chiefly status, since they are related to mythical 
chiefs: the majahi is the jaguar’s hunting bow, and it appears in the origin myth as 
the weapon of Enitsuẽgü, the jaguar-father of the twins Taũgi (Sun) and Aulukumã 
(Moon); the hawk feather refers to the bird chief; and the scarlet macaw feather is 
linked to Aulukumã, from whose blood that bird was created.
Unlike the speeches that chiefs deliver to each other during ritual meetings, in 
a low tone, this one should be pronounced in a loud voice, so as to wake the whole 
village up. Ageu explained it was directed to the boys’ parents, and its purpose was 
“to guide his people.” He calls his audience ukandagü, “our folks” or “our people.” 
Andagü is the possessed form of anda, a word that’s difficult to translate and doesn’t 
seem to apply outside of the chieftaincy context. It has no plural, and refers to a 
group of people. It only appears in its relational and possessive form, preceded by 
the name of someone and followed by the relational suffix -gü (“X andagü,” with 
X being a chief). The expression indicates, thus, an asymmetrical relationship be-
tween a denominated (individualized) person and an undifferentiated collective—
in this case, between someone possessing the words to guide a people, and those 
who need guiding.
In the transcriptions that follow, each numerated line corresponds to a melodic 
unit. There aren’t, in almost any of them, any complete sentences, since the enunci-
ations are broken down into parallel verses. There are certain exceptions, in which 
various “lines in potential” were agglutinated by the speaker in one single melodic 
unit (enunciated in the same tone with no pauses to breath), but whose structure 
(preceded by an expletive—ah—and followed by a regular set of particles) suggests 
they could be executed as discrete melodic units.
Because there are few lexical elements in each melodic unit, it is difficult to 
translate the speeches. These elements are followed by several grammatical par-
ticles of complex meaning, with regular and formalized use. There are even lines 
formed only by an expletive and a set of particles, with no lexical element. The infe-
riorizing particle muke is one of the most recurrent, and makes up self-derogatory 
forms of speech. It reduces the importance of what the speaker says, producing 
what Ellen Basso (2009: 246) calls a “humbling effect.” Another element used quite 
frequently is the deictic ige, an evidential particle that indicates proximity/pres-
ence/existence, fixed to the copula -i (Franchetto 2000: 492). The particle gitse may 
also be frequently found, which would mean, according to Basso (2009), “poorly,” 
“incomplete.” Franchetto (2000) defines it as a “devaluating particle.” It’s always 
used by chiefs when they speak of the present, or when they use the imperative—as 
if the present were imperfect, and the imperative needed to be softened or deval-
ued. Finally, the adverb gele (“still”) abounds, as does the emphatic suffix -ha (ibid.: 
492–503).
The speech starts as follows:
1 Kamaῖ, Kamaῖ, Kamaῖ, Kamaῖ, 
Kamaῖ, Kamaῖ
My brother, my brother, my brother, 
my brother, my brother, my brother
Ah, luale muke ataitsange Ah, please, let it be so
Ah, etijipügüha gitse itakeingakeha 
gitse
Ah, take your children from their 
hammocks
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Ah, kutaũpüaõ muke geleha gitse, ah, 
uitunguki muke geleha gitse
Ah, from the sleep, ah, of our 
grandparents
5 Etijipügüha gitse itakeingakeha gitse Take your children from their 
hammocks
Inke ande ehisuü̃daõ itsa Look, here are your brothers
Ah, itsasüha engihisatanümingo Ah, they will deal with their work
Ah, kingakeha gitse etijipügü hekeha 
gitse
Ah, always tell your children
Ah, muke geleha gitse6 –
10 Ah, igehunguki muke geleha gitse Ah, this way
Ah, kutengatanini muke geleha gitse Ah, all of us are moving on
Ah, isekalu tohoila muke geleha gitse Ah, without making any noise
Ah, itseke tologu heke muke geleha 
gitse
Ah, the spirits’ bird
Ah, kutekaginetatanini muke geleha 
gitse
Ah, it’s scaring all of us
Starting from line 3, we may see that the devaluating particle gitse ends almost ev-
ery line, forming a block of parallel verses in which the chief gives advice and com-
ments on the present situation of his people. The chief opens his speech referring 
to his audience as kamaῖ, which means “my brother” in “the ancients’ language,” 
and in this context it’s a synonym for anetü. So, the orator speaks to his peers, other 
chiefs, whom he requests to wake up their children. The use of the imperative-hor-
tative mood is characteristic, but the recurrence of gitse makes the speech sound 
more like a piece of advice, or a humble suggestion, than an order.
According to the interpretation of a Matipu chief, the children mentioned in 
the discourse are chiefs’ children, youth preparing to master the art of Xinguano 
ritual-sportive wrestling (ikindene). It used to be that youth preparing to become 
ikindene champions would be woken very early, and spend hours and hours sitting 
on their hammocks in silence thinking about the wrestling, their behavior, and lis-
tening to their father’s advice. According to the Matipu chief, this was so that these 
champions could become strong and fast messengers (ngengoku7) for other chiefs 
when there were rituals to be performed.
In lines 11 and 12, the chief takes up a recurrent subject in other speeches, the 
lack of “noise” in his village. “All of us are moving on/Without making any noise” 
means that rituals are no longer performed, which is why people are living sadly. 
(The Kalapalo emphasize that one of the aims of the rituals is to produce beauty 
and joy.) “The spirits’ bird,” mentioned in line 13, is the chicken, and the spirits are, 
according to the orator, the Whites. This passage also seems to be tied to the lack 
6. Typical formulaic phrase of anetü itaginhu, with no lexical content.
7. In the context of regional rituals, ngengoku is translated as “messenger,” but the Kala-
palo generally translate it as “employee.”
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of “noise” and rituals. In times of festivities, from way before the sun rises, it’s com-
mon for men to emit long high-pitched and melodic screams as soon as they wake 
up, which are responded to by others in their own homes, in order to wake the 
whole village up with joy. The message the chief conveys is that, unfortunately, his 
people no longer wake up with joy, but scared of the chanting of the “spirits’ bird.”
The following passage embodies a central concept of Kalapalo chieftaincy—aki-
hekugene, or “the practice of true/good words”:
15 Ah, kutaũpüaõko muke ata hale igei 
ũãke
Ah, but our grandparents
Akihekugeneki higei ũãke, etiji-
pügüko muke ata hale igei ũãke, ihijü 
heke muke ata hale igei ũãke
By practicing the true words, on 
their children, they worked
Ah, üngelepe entanügü muke gele 
higei ũãke
Ah, those who have already died 
would come
Akihekugeneki higei ũãke By practicing the true words
Ah, tihisatühügü muke gele higei 
ũãke
Ah, [to do] what they were taught
20 Ah, tüilüinha muke gele higei ũãke Ah, to do
Ah, tüãdagü muke gele higei ũãke Ah, for their people
Ah, upetegijüinha muke gele higei 
ũãke
Ah, to guide
Akihekugeneki higei ũãke By practicing the true words
Ah, tihisatühügü tüilüinha muke gele 
higei ũãke
Ah, by doing what they were taught 
to do
25 Ah, kutaũpüaõko muke ata hale igei 
ũãke
Ah, our grandparents
Akihekugeneki higei ũãke By practicing the true words
Tetijipügüko hijü heke muke ata hale 
igei ũãke
They worked on their children
In contrast with the first block, all lines of this passage end with the epistemic mark-
er ũãke. It is used in affirmations about the past, and indicates that the speaker has 
authority over his speech (Franchetto 2000: 492), whether by direct knowledge or, 
as is the case here, by having received the information from people with the author-
ity to transmit it—that is, previous chiefs. The passage is about past chiefs, called 
“our grandfathers” or by the anaphoric pronoun üngelepe, which I have translated 
as “those who have already died.” The anaphoric üngele (that) and ünago (those) are 
indirect forms of saying “chief(s)” throughout the anetü itaginhu.
Akihekugene is what I have translated as the “the practice of true words,” a term 
formed from aki (word), hekugu (true/good), and the nominative suffix -ne (Santos 
2007). The general meaning of the expression aki hekugu, “true word,” describes any 
good, lovely, calm, peace-bringing, or incentivizing speech, and those recognized 
for speaking the truth and being good people are called akiheku, or takihekuginhü 
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(“whose words are true/good”). Yet its specific meaning refers to chiefs’ speech-
making, who by definition must have been trained to be well behaved and have 
great rhetorical skills, capable of guiding their people in a calm and humble way 
(“to do what they were taught to do”). Akihekugene is the Kalapalo version of Clas-
tres’ “edifying discourse.”
Regarding past chiefs, it is said that they did what they were taught, “worked” on 
their children by using the true speech. “To work” here is a way of saying “making,” 
and the relationship between parents and children is indeed conceived as a relation-
ship of fabrication, in which children are the result of the father’s intentional and 
continuous effort. This is not only a description of the past, but rather a complex 
resource through which the past serves as an example because it contrasts with the 
present—such as the contrasting use of hale in lines 15, 16, 25, and 27 makes clear. 
The chief constructs an opposition between past and present, in which the latter is 
nothing more than an impoverished form of a previous age idealized as grandiose: 
there were chiefs who, with their good speech, “worked” on their children, but such 
is no longer true nowadays.
However, this is exactly what the chief is doing, despite denying it in his speech. 
Moreover, the chief can only do it by denying it: in order to act like a chief, to “work 
on his children” like an ancestor, he must state that he could never do so. By acting 
in this way he demonstrates how a chief should behave: as the most humble of per-
sons. Denying his position, diminishing himself in front of past chiefs, he displays 
the behavior expected of a genuine anetü.
Discussing Kuna shamanism, Severi (2004) argues that what allows the shaman 
to lend his voice to invisible beings and heal his patients are the symbolic connec-
tions between the world of ordinary life and the supernatural world, which are 
achieved by a common linguistic resource: parallelism. Through the enchainment 
of repeated verses and themes, the shaman is symbolically identified as a paradoxi-
cal character, at one time human and nonhuman, here and there, in the present 
time and in the mythic time. As Stanley Tambiah (1968) had already shown, paral-
lelism may establish a chain of analogies that, more than just “comparing” different 
subjects or objects, may transfer properties from one being to another.
In the chief ’s speech, we may consider that there is not only a formal parallelism 
between verses and blocks, but also a “performative parallelism” between the actual 
chief and those before him. The present time and the chief who speaks, despite the 
emphasized contrast, replicate the past in his performance. In the chief ’s speech, 
persons and times are contrasted, but in his actions the difference between past and 
present is attenuated, and his actions and those of ancient chiefs are made parallel 
to one another. He speaks about ancestors, as an ancestor (using their language), 
and on ancestors’ behalf (since they are gone).
The Kalapalo say that the contrast between past and present is supposed to pro-
voke “shame” in the listeners, who feel compelled to act as the ancient chiefs’ own 
children. We could say, then, that the antonymic affirmations in the speech have 
something similar to what Austin (1975) calls “illocutionary force,” which gives the 
chief the capacity to perform an act in saying something. Hyperbole and contrast 
are the means by which the audience could be aesthetically and morally compelled 
to act in some way, as in what Austin called “perlocutionary acts.”
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Ah, luale muke ataitsüha Ah, please, let it be so
Ah, etijipügüko tehugu igakanügü 
muke ataitsüe kangamuke hekeni 
muke
Ah, set aside food for your children’s 
bellies, children
30 Ah, luale muke ataitsüha Ah, please, this is how it should be
Ah, etijipügügüko tehugu igakanügü 
muka tsitsü ehekeni
Ah, set aside food for your children’s 
bellies
Ah, ukugepeki manga igei ũãke Ah, it was with that which had once 
been human
Angaũpüaõko muke gele igei ũãke That your grandparents
Etuatanügü muke gele igei ũãke They got exhausted
35 Ah, ukugepeki higei ũãke Ah, it was with that which had once 
been human
Angaũpüaõko muke gele higei ũãke That your grandparents
Etuatanügü muke gele higei ũãke They got exhausted
Ah, kohinhanduhüngüki, ah, kumin-
hangokiha uketuanalü
Ah, with that which isn’t bush, ah, 
with our food we get exhausted
This passage is about the importance of cultivating corn, called “that which had 
once been human” (line 35) in reference to the mythical human origin of the plant. 
Corn cultivation used to be important during the rainy season, when manioc isn’t 
harvested. In the old days, Xinguano peoples weren’t always able to stock large 
quantities of manioc starch for the rainy season, and corn fields were very impor-
tant. Nowadays, with bagging, it has become possible to store enough starch and, 
as such, few people plant corn.
The final part of the Hawk’s Speech is about cultivating another plant crucial to 
Xinguano diet—manioc—and the dangers of witchcraft:
Ahütü muke ataitsüha You shouldn’t
40 Ah, engihitsügüko ukukijila ehekeni Ah, rub that which you have worked 
with
Ah, ingike muke niha gitse Ah, look
Ah, tekundipüngühüngü ekutanügü 
muke geleha gitse kupeheni muke 
geleha gitse
Ah, it’s not inedible food this that we 
are eating
Ah, muke geleha gitse –
Ah, igehunguki muke geleha gitse 
kutengatanini muke geleha gitse
Ah, as such we’re all moving on
45 Ah, isekalu tohoila muke geleha gitse Ah, without making any noise
Ah, kutengatanini muke geleha gitse Ah, we’re all moving on
Ahütü ataitsü You shouldn’t
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Ah, engihitsügüko ukukijila ehekeni, 
kangamuke
Ah, rub that which you have worked 
with, children
Ingike muke niha gitse Look
50 Ah, ande tekundipüngühüngü eku-
tanügü kupeheni muke geleha gitse
Ah, it’s not inedible food this that we 
are eating
In lines 40 and 48, ukukijila, a negative form of ukukijü, “to rub against,” is a meta-
phor for “bewitch.” Engihitsügüko, in the same lines, means “what was worked on,” 
and it refers to manioc leaves cut off from the plants. A spell on these leaves may 
destroy someone’s manioc crops, and this is the danger the passage is talking about. 
“It’s not inedible food this that we are eating” (lines 42 and 50), says the chief, but 
it’s clear that this is a risk in the case of witchcraft—a risk that the chief ’s speech has 
the aim of avoiding. The Kalapalo say that if there is a lot of witchcraft in the village, 
it’s because the chiefs are not giving good advice to their people. Ideally, wherever 
chiefs are respected, people don’t seek to harm others or cast spells that may destroy 
a whole village. Yet when the chief is weakened, the danger of witchcraft is greater, 
since with no guidance, people tend to be more egoistic, “go crazy,” and forget about 
their relatives—the first step in producing a witch.
The succession of parallel verses ending with the same particles produces an an-
tithetic parallelism of blocks that oppose each other: blocks formed by verses ended 
in gitse refer to the present, and those formed by verses ended in ũãke refer to the 
past. We may note a poetic structure in this speech: (1) an opening line; (2) counsel-
ing, with verses ending in gitse (lines 2–14); (3) contrast between past and present, 
with verses ending in ũãke (lines 15–27); (4) counseling, with no special mark on 
verses (lines 28–31); (5) contrast between past and present, with verses ending in 
ũãke (lines 32–37); counseling, with verses ending in gitse (lines 38–50).
The key themes of the Hawk’s Speech are the foundations of kinship: generating 
and raising children, producing food, and avoiding witchcraft (i.e., thinking about 
kin, instead of forgetting them). It’s as if the chief ’s speech led the fabrication of 
kin’s bodies on another scale, fomenting the fabrication of a collective body of kin, 
organized around a metaphoric relationship of filiation between chiefs and their 
people (I’ll return to corporality later). The chief ’s rhetoric, by pointing out the 
imperfections of the present as well as an ideal of social life, is supposed to encour-
age people to behave like kin, a kind of behavior that needs to be actively produced 
in face of desegregating forces such as lack of rituals and witchcraft. (Gow [1991: 
226–27] develops a similar argument about the Piro.)
Nothing in this speech may characterize it as an authoritarian discourse; to 
the contrary, the chief humbly requests, advises, but, as Allan Passes says about 
Pa’ikwené leaders’ rhetoric, this is precisely why such words “hold within them the 
positive moral and creative element of power; and contain meaningfulness, value, 
artistry and affective mass” (Passes 1998: 138). Or, as Fernando Santos-Granero 
(1991: 302) suggests, “the speech of the Amerindian leaders carries the weight of an 
order without appearing as such, for it is grounded in moral considerations shared 
by both leaders and followers.” Maybe we could add that, together with such moral 
considerations (and without focusing only on “authority” or “power”), the formal 
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use of antonymic affirmations and parallelism is a piece of artistry which redefines 
the chief ’s identity and that of his people, creating, at least for a brief moment, a 
world where the difference between chiefs and nonchiefs can be effective. And, as in 
rituals for spirits or in shamanism, the world that brings together different subjects 
comes into being only for a short period, but its effects are expected to endure.
Ekege akitsu: The Jaguar’s Speech
The Jaguar’s Speech should also be delivered in a loud voice in the center of the 
village, but after sunset. The chief should also be turned toward the east, but now 
he needs to speak crouched down and looking toward the ground—as if he were 
facing a foreign chief, in a respectful/ashamed position. The difference in positions 
refers to body postures of the animals that own the speeches: in the morning, the 
body must be positioned just like a resting hawk—standing on a tree branch—and 
at night like a jaguar. The time of day when each speech is given also refers to these 
animals’ active periods: the hawk hunts during the daytime, while the jaguar is a 
mainly crepuscular-nocturnal animal. Speaking is part of a complete performance 
involving the chief ’s body, and, as in other Amerindian rituals, to “act like” other 
beings is to become something like them, activating their own bodily—and thus 
subjective—capacities.
This speech has a pessimistic tone; when the day is over, the chief lectures on 
the difficulties of the present time—the lack of chiefs to guide their people, and 
the deaths provoked by spirits and the Whites. If the sunrise speech is about the 
process of kinship and life, its sunset counterpart speaks not as much about death, 
but rather about the uncertainties of the future and the importance of the chiefs in 
giving continuity to collective life (i.e., the very condition of kinship).
1 Ah, kangamuke, kangamuke, 
kangamuke
Ah, children, children, children
Ah, luale muke ataitsüha gitse Ah, please, let it be so
Ataipanenatüeha gitse Rejoice
Ah, tü akisü kaemanga gitse kutengalüko 
egea gitse?
Ah, with the speech of whom we 
have always followed, like so?
5 Ah, ukugetihü akisü kae muke ata hale 
gitse
Ah, with the speech of a chief
Ah, kutehotanünkgo muke ata hale gitse Ah, we would follow
Ah, muke geleha igia kutengatanini 
muke geleha gitse
Ah, but even so we still follow
Tetihoi muke geleha gitse With no mainstay
Ah, kutengatanini muke gele higei (gitse) Ah, we follow
10 Ah, itseke heke muke gele higei, ah, 
tünotohokoki muke gele ah ukinahane-
tatanini muke
Ah, the spirits, ah with their 
mortal objects, ah, they are kill-
ing us
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While the Hawk’s Speech starts by exhorting the chief ’s “brothers,” this one starts 
with the word “children.” If, at first, the chief treats his interlocutors in a symmetri-
cal way, now he speaks to them in an asymmetrical way. “Children” is the most 
common form of address of a chief to his people, to whom he is like an adop-
tive father. This aspect of the relationship between a chief and his people evokes 
a set of relations recurrent throughout indigenous South America, centered on 
the figure of “owners” or “masters.” According to a synthesis developed by Carlos 
Fausto (2008: 330), the concept of owner “designates a position that involves con-
trol and/or protection, engenderment and/or possession, and that applies to re-
lationships between people (humans and nonhuman) and between people and 
things (tangible or not),” generally formulated according to the symbolic language 
of adoptive affiliation.
A chief ’s position as an adoptive father is tied to the production of kinship in a 
village. This is made evident by the use of an interesting term for “chief ”: ukugetihü 
(line 5). The Kalapalo, trying to segment this word, divide it into ukuge, “people,” 
and (t)ihü, “trunk/stem” or “body,” which would permit translating ukugetihü as 
the “people’s trunk-body.” The suggested translation gains force when we look at 
the expression katote ihü (or katotihü), “trunk-body of all,” which can also be used 
in the same sense. Another form of saying chief is iho, which means “mainstay” or 
“prop”—something made from a tree trunk. In its literal meaning, iho refers to the 
wooden post on which a person ties his or her hammock, but its semantic field is 
greater, designating a person responsible for giving support to others (a father or 
owner of a house, for example). A chief is also called kuge iho, “people’s mainstay,” 
since it is understood that a chief ’s duty is taking care of his people.
The condition of iho is tied to the production of kinship and a collective point 
of view in the Xinguano system. As elsewhere in the indigenous Amazon, nobody 
is born completely human. For a baby to become fully human, proper nurturing, 
protection, and affection must be offered to it, a long process that fabricates the 
baby’s body in the image of its parents’. Becoming a person means becoming some-
one’s kin, and vice-versa (Gow 1997; Coelho de Souza 2002, Vilaça 2002). On the 
one hand, a child starts to become someone’s kin at home, with its parents; on the 
other, this process is only completed in rituals, since becoming an adult person 
means coming out of seclusion during a regional ritual. Villages capable of spon-
soring rituals are precisely the largest ones, where, according to the Kalapalo, there 
must be at least one great chief capable of bringing enough people together. In a 
village—which needs an iho/chief to endure—living together, sharing meals, and 
reciprocity are responsible for producing a generalized kind of kinshiping, trans-
forming a heterogeneous collective of covillagers into a differentiated “we” in the 
multiethnic Xinguano complex.
In order to produce collectives on varied scales, an asymmetrical relationship 
is necessary between a body/trunk/mainstay and the people who live around it, 
and chiefs are the human form of this trunk-body. Despite the passage above say-
ing there isn no mainstay/trunk whose speech the group may follow, the Kalapalo 
state that the chief is actually “lying a little”: he says that there is no one to guide his 
people, while the truth is that he is obviously doing so (as we have already seen in 
the Hawk’s Speech).
2015 | Hau: Journal of Ethnographic Theory 5 (1): 59–85
75 Political chimeras
Finally, there’s the issue of white people, once more taken as spirits. The mortal 
objects that the chief speaks of mean Western commodities, long seen as witchcraft. 
With the epidemics that broke out from the late nineteenth to the mid-twentieth 
centuries, the Upper Xingu peoples quickly associated white people’s objects with 
diseases and sorcery.
Ah, luale muke ataitsü egekaluko, 
kangamuke
Ah, please, let it be so, make noise, 
children
Ataipanenatüe ataitsü hetsange May you all rejoice
Indegela muke gele akangabaha igei 
gitse
It’s not here
Ah, kutelüko hata muke geleha gitse Ah, where we follow
15 Ah, kutaũpüaõko muke geleha gitse, 
ah, engikapügütela leha gitse
Ah, it’s not in a place cleared out by 
our grandparents
Ah, kutelüko hata muke leha gitse Ah, where we follow
Once again the chief exhorts his people to make noise and rejoice, since their liv-
ing conditions don’t favor joy—they no longer live in a village cleared out by their 
grandparents, but in other people’s village. It’s difficult to interpret this passage. 
Since they moved to Aiha, the Kalapalo live in Kamayurá territory, and to this day 
these Tupi provoke them by saying that they no longer inhabit a village where their 
grandparents are buried. If we interpret the above passage literally, we might be led 
to think that it refers to this specific situation, which could have been incorporated 
into the speech at some point in the last fifty years. Yet the situation gets more com-
plicated if we consider that the man who taught this speech to his son had never 
delivered it in Aiha, but only in the old Kalapalo village, whose region had been 
densely occupied by the Kalapalo since at least the beginnings of the eighteenth 
century. In a trip to the region, Ageu referred to that territory as the place “where 
his grandparents gave their speeches.” The way I see it is that living in a place that 
hadn’t been cleared out by one’s ancestors is the same as saying that there are no 
more chiefs: the antonym is a rhetorical resource chosen to affirm something in 
a subtle and humble way. By denying a relationship with the land, or his chiefly 
condition, the speaker is actually emphasizing his position as a substitute for all the 
chiefs who had spoken there before him. He is a mainstay, a trunk growing on the 
land giving support to the production of a collective body of kin—and, thus, he is 
the personification of that body.
Ah, luale muke ataitsü atipanenünkgo, 
kangamuke
Ah, please, let it be so, rejoice, 
children
Isekalu tohoila mukeha kutengatani-
niha gitse
Without making noise we keep on 
following
Tü akisü kaemana gitse kutengalükoha 
gitse
With the words of whom do we 
follow?
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20 Ah, ukugetihü akisü haindipügü kae 
muke ata hale gitse
Ah, with the speech of a chief, of 
someone aged
Ah, kutehotanünkgo muke ata hale 
gitse
Ah, we would be following
Ah, isekalu tohoila muke geleha gitse 
kutengatanini muke geleha gitse
Ah, without making noise we 
keep on following
Ah, luale muke ataitsüha gitse Ah, please, let it be so
Ataimpanenatüe Rejoice
The speech ends by going back to the problem of a lack of “noise” (feasts/joy) and 
the lack of a chief (hence the hypothetical usage seen in line 21: “we would be fol-
lowing,” kutehotanünkgo). It makes sense that the speech be delivered at sunset: 
it’s not only the end of a day, but also the (supposed) end of a people who live in 
sadness, with no chief whose words they may follow, besides their ancestral lands, 
and also threatened by the mortal objects of the spirits (whether these be acts of 
witchcraft, or Western commodities). If the sunrise speech focuses on the kinship 
process itself, the sunset speech points toward the fragile continuity of this process, 
and the importance that chiefs and their words may have in it.
Speaking, hearing, transforming
One night, a man sleeping on a hammock near mine got up, picked up a slingshot, 
and went outside. When he returned and I asked him what he had gone to do, he 
told me that he had gone out to kill an owl, since he thought that its hoot was simi-
lar to the expression keteha!, “let’s go!” The animal could be the form taken on by 
the soul of a deceased relative or friend trying to call him and, were he to clearly 
hear the owl’s chant just like a human voice, he would soon die and meet up with 
whoever had been calling out to him. While the owl’s hoot is heard as such, it is seen 
as a mere animal; when its hoot is perceived as a human voice, this is a sign that 
whoever hears it is being transformed into a being of the same kind as the enuncia-
tor. While walking through the woods, people are also in danger of hearing the calls 
of animals that may sound just like human voices. This implies a process of starting 
to become “a bit animal like,” starting to live with these beings, developing a body 
similar to theirs, and becoming their kin, which causes disease and possibly death.
Viveiros de Castro argues that, in multinaturalistic ontologies such as those 
found throughout lowland South America, the positions of human and nonhuman, 
as well as the circulation between such positions, have a pronominal character. In a 
world where everyone may occupy the position of subject/human in a relation, this 
position is nonetheless unequally distributed. The reflexive I of the subject can re-
late either to a He/she, objectified as part of nature, or to a You, encompassing him/
her in the point of view of the speaker:
The typical supernatural situation in the Amerindian world is the 
encounter, in the forest, between a human—always alone—and a being 
that, firstly seen as a mere animal or person, reveals itself as a spirit 
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or as dead, and talks to the man.  .  .  . Whoever answers to a You said 
by a nonhuman accepts the condition of being its “second person,” 
and by assuming, in turn, the position of I he will already do it as a 
nonhuman. (Viveiros de Castro 2002: 397)
Language for the Kalapalo is taken as a characteristic of the human condition, 
which, for many Amerindians, is shared by virtually all beings. In such cosmolo-
gies, the human soul—the capacity to utter an I—is seen as a given, while differ-
ences between beings must be actively produced in (and by means of) their bodies 
(Viveiros de Castro 2002). Creating a common human condition means producing 
similar bodies, and being able to communicate verbally, besides being a marker of 
this condition, also seems to be a force capable of taking part in its creation, since it 
implies the differential positioning, through language and communication, of the 
related parties. As the dangers of hearing the uttering of other beings suggests, lan-
guage is capable of engendering the mutual bodily assimilation of subjects: hearing 
what other beings say could make the listener suffer a corporal transformation that 
attracts it to the enunciator’s point of view.
I suggest that the discourses analyzed here could be taken as part of this same 
relational matrix. The logic of ritual action in the Upper Xingu (and among 
Amerindians) is metamorphosis: by producing corporal alterations it becomes 
possible to transform a person into an agent, allocating this person in the uni-
verse of difference and potential affinity the locus of the capacity of agency (Coelho 
de Souza 2002). Beasts of prey are usually considered the most powerful agents, 
thus having greater capacity to attract others to their point of view—a hierarchical 
encompassing movement that may be interpreted from the logic of “familiarizing 
predation” (Fausto 2008: 335). Chiefs’ ritual speech should be seen according to 
the same logic: when a chief addresses his audience as You, “speaking like” a bird of 
prey or a hunting cat, he activates the capacities of agency of these beings, occupy-
ing the reflexive position of I, and thus becoming capable of not only having a point 
of view, but also attracting others to it by symbolically defining them as his poten-
tial prey. The apparent paradox is that, in becoming “prey,” people also become kin 
(both to the chief and to each other).
This surely isn’t an exclusively Xinguano feature, and it evokes Course’s discus-
sion on “excess force” of language as used among the Mapuche. For the author, 
“speech itself is understood to be saturated with an excess of force (newen) which ul-
timately distances every utterance from the control of its speaker” (Course 2012: 8), 
in such a way that language has the capacity to produce effects independently of 
the speaker’s intentions, as if it were an agent itself. Indeed, Passes (1998: 6–7) had 
already made a similar observation, arguing that in the Amazon it’s common to 
attribute power to words, “with utterances being endowed with the cosmogonic 
power of creation and destruction.” This also becomes clear in the conceptions the 
Kalapalo maintain on “spells” (kehege), words of enchantment capable of “adher-
ing” to objects or persons in order to produce effects.
It seems important that, despite his use of chiefly insignia and his bodily po-
sition, the chief has to be invisible to his fellow villagers: he speaks either before 
sunrise, when they are still in their homes, or after sunset, when they have already 
returned. He speaks loudly in order to be heard, but must not be seen. The use of 
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status objects is intended not to be seen by the people, but to activate the capacities 
of the beings with which those objects are related: the mythic jaguar-chief, and the 
twins Sun and Moon, who passed on their chiefly condition to some humans. He 
also needs to be unspeakable: the orator disappears from the discourse by oppos-
ing himself to past anetü and affirming the nonexistence of a present-day chief. A 
predatory and collectivizing force has to be produced in the chief ’s body, but it also 
must be attenuated by his invisibility and absence from discourse. Alterity enables 
the chief to become “great”—magnified (Sztutman 2012)—and encompass others, 
but it also brings the risk of transforming him into a complete stranger, an Other.
Following Beatriz Perrone-Moisés (2012), Amerindian chiefs are in a “between-
two” position, mediating the relations between the self and the other in a world 
where alterity is essential to the production of sociality, and limits are never rigid. 
In this sense, chieftaincy seems closer to shamanism. Such a mediating position is 
important in a world where its political figures, as Perrone-Moisés says, “are nev-
er ‘completely’ this or that” (ibid.: 10). Ameridian political figures move “in the 
‘space-relation’ between poles, without ever fixing in one of them” (ibid.). They 
occupy the cosmopolitical space to where different beings must converge in order 
to become fully human, but this is always a movement between identity and differ-
ence, and not a state. As Perrone-Moisés argues, Amerindian chieftaincy “is located 
in the interval of the opposition between being and not-being, neither one thing 
nor the other, nor the sum of the two” (ibid.: 20). Difference cannot be abolished 
by complete identity, since such inertia would mean the ceasing of social life. As 
Amerindian cosmogonies emphasize, there can only be perfect stability, identity, 
and hierarchy among the dead.
What becomes immediately “visible,” perceptible, through the chief ’s speech? 
Although in a humble way, the speaker defines his identity as a substitute of de-
ceased chiefs. (Everybody understands that the chief is “lying a little” when denying 
his position.) He also brings the listeners’ attention to “indexical signs” that invite 
the audience to complete the picture with something that is invisible, but is none-
theless part of the performance. Who might be discoursing before dawn or after 
sunset, and addressing others as his “children”? As is known from myths and ritual 
performances, the chiefly condition is founded in a predatory bodily quality, which 
results in the subjective capacity of uniting a plurality of persons in a single body of 
kin. The act of delivering speeches may suggest to the minds of the audience that 
the one speaking could be a hawk (who owns the first speech) or a jaguar (owner of 
the second one). This would be explicit if the audience could see the chief ’s body. 
The mental image of the chief would thus be completed by means of the projection 
of an invisible, but nonetheless necessary, part of it. The ritual performance there-
fore assembles two contradictory perceptions of the chief, a political agent with a 
properly chimeric aesthetic.
This argument is reinforced by the Kalapalo idea that, during the Hawk’s Speech, 
a kind of kiskadee bird8 replies from its home: “You say that you take care of us, but 
you eat us.” There is a “logic of the sensible” underlying this statement: the kiska-
dee (specially the great kiskadee), despite its modest size, is famous for defending 
its nest from attacks by birds of prey. The kiskadee’s fear can only be understood if 
8.  The bem-te-vi, in Portuguese.
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we suppose that the chief could exert some kind of force over his people through 
the form of predation. Indeed, chiefs may be dangerous, and they must deliber-
ately be “tamed” so that they behave well with their group. If we see the word as 
the complete opposite of violence, as Clastres proposes, ritual speech tends to be 
dissociated from any sort of symbolic efficacy; however, if we see it as a modality 
of predatory force in a perspectivist ontology, we may understand why the chief ’s 
speech, when aesthetically controlled and moderated, is important, and also what 
the kiskadee is worried about.
This chimeric composition is reversed in other situations. If in these ritual 
speeches the predator-quality of the chief is invisible, it is brought to the foreground 
when chiefs appear to foreigners, presenting visual signs of the jaguar, the harpy, or 
the anaconda. As I have argued elsewhere (Guerreiro 2011), this ritual confronta-
tion between chiefs who present themselves as enemies or potential affines to each 
other “cuts” the continuum of the Xinguano regional network, creating the condi-
tions for the emergence of kinship in different collectives. Such duality is constitu-
tive of chiefly persons, and must be made perceptible in every situation where such 
agents are meant to be effective. This relation is never symmetrical, though, but 
hierarchical. In order for the consanguine aspect to be visible, the affinal/predator 
one must be invisible; conversely, when the predator-like quality must be shown, its 
counterpart is kept hidden, but not absent or obliterated: extralinguistic aspects of 
the chief ’s performance point to their quality as enemies/affines, just as the visible 
jaguar-chief ’s aesthetic in front of his people when confronting opposing groups 
points to his condition as a protector/consanguine.
This echoes qualities and effects of Amerindian graphic arts: 
In Amazonian art, lines call the attention to what connects and not to 
what separates distinct bodies and beings, it is an art of between-two: 
connecting human beings and animals by the quality of having designs, 
just as the visible and invisible sides. .  .  . What is drawn is, rather than 
their form, the relation that connects and constitutes them. (Severi and 
Lagrou 2013: 14–15)
In the Kalapalo case, it seems that language and the chief ’s bodily performance do 
the same, pointing to the relations between humanity and animality, consanguinity 
and affinity, hierarchy and symmetry, which constitute chieftaincy and social life.
Conclusion
The aim of this article was to discuss how “chimerical images” could be made ef-
fective in political rituals. I hope this also contributes toward an ethnography of 
the verbal genre known as “chiefs’ speech” in the Upper Xingu, and a better un-
derstanding, through Kalapalo own “modes of description,” of some relationships 
between ritual, aesthetics, and politics in Amazonia. As we have seen, by delivering 
a speech a chief is not merely “preaching in the wilderness.” Besides being a com-
plex verbal art, both refined and quite valued, the chief ’s speech is a fine indigenous 
reflection on both kinship and power, the relations between consanguinity and af-
finity, identity and difference, symmetry and hierarchy.
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Discussing Kuna shamanic chants, Severi (2004: 816) argues that “the enuncia-
tion of ‘obscure words’ does not imply the intention to convey a meaningful mes-
sage to the patient, but tends to construct an acoustic mask, indirectly defining 
the nature of the shaman-chanter” (see also Severi 2015: 224). He argues that an 
“acoustic mask” is “a reflexive means to define the ritual identity of the speaker” 
(Severi 2004: 830–31), evoking the same kind of bodily transformation produced 
in ritual action among Amerindians, in which masks may bring to presence su-
pernatural beings by the controlled metamorphosis of the person wearing such 
objects. Kuna chants would produce the shaman-chanter as a “paradoxical enun-
ciator,” which condenses contradictory characteristics and capacities—he would be 
at the same time a shaman in the past, an actual human shaman, and a spirit—en-
dowing him with the capacity to realize effective symbolic actions.
We see the same kind of symbolic operation in Kalapalo chiefly discourses. The 
speeches use paradoxical affirmations that define the chief as a substitute of the 
ancestors, a father, a mainstay—a consanguine—and at the same time his bodily 
indexes define him as a potential nonhuman predator. His audience’s identity is 
also produced by paradoxical connotations: they are simultaneously his kin and 
his prey, a chiefless people and a people with a chief. The audience is the chief ’s 
“second person,” a collective You brought to his perspective, but the absence of any 
answer could also be seen as a resistance to it.
Through discourse, the chief is produced as a complex enunciator, as is his peo-
ple created as a “complex addressee.” Chiefly oratory is not “about” something, but 
is intended to produce a set of differences by means of which sociality is created: 
chief/nonchief, predator/prey, individual/collective, affine/consanguine, hierar-
chy/equality: the poles of a “dualism in perpetual disequilibrium” that gives move-
ment to social life. Such ritual performances, in their unique form, create a kind 
of relational situation that exists only through ritual condensation, but provides a 
background for everyday life. As is clear, while dealing with political oratory we 
must not appeal to external causes, such as tradition, authority, or belief, to under-
stand its efficacy, but we must understand how meaning and persons are contextu-
ally produced through discursive pragmatics.
It’s noteworthy that the symbolic resources used in chiefly speeches to produce 
the identities of the interlocutors are basically the same found by Silverstein in 
other forms of political oratory: parallelism and indexical signs. Discussing a male 
genre of “gossip”, called talanoa, in a Fijian village, Silverstein shows that what is at 
stake in such talk is not the communication of complete and organized stories, but 
rhythmically coconstructed conversations that, rather than asserting something, 
only point to known or supposed facts by other participants (Silverstein 2005: 6). 
The coalition of persons in this discursive coconstructions would point to their 
social identities as participants of potential political factions (ibid.: 9). The same 
would apply for speeches given by American politicians that, rather than commu-
nicating messages on “political issues,” would use poetics to identify them with a 
set of such issues, thus making them inhabit the message and constructing their 
identities as different from others.
Apparently, political oratory in “state societies” is just as “empty” as in “societ-
ies against the state”: it’s not the referential content of the message that matters, 
but the effects of the poetics on the participants’ identities. However, there still 
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are important differences: while the political discourses discussed by Silverstein 
intend to produce an identity relation between the speaker and his audience (as in 
the American case), or between the cospeakers (as in the Fijian case), the speeches 
discussed here seem to introduce a difference between the parties. When Kalapalo 
listeners understand themselves as the chief ’s children, they are reminded that he 
is also different, an Other, as a hawk or a jaguar. Also, in order to “inhabit the mes-
sage” in those cases, one has to create a resonance between oneself and the themes 
one speaks about. Kalapalo oratory, however, produces dissonance when the chief 
dissociates himself from the message, attributing its “true” form to deceased chiefs. 
On the one side, such observations may account for specific qualities of Amer-
indian politics, such as the alternation between hierarchy and symmetry. On the 
other, our analysis may lead us see Kalapalo ritual speech as closer to other forms 
of political oratory, in an exercise of anthropological symmetrization.
The ambiguous character of the interlocutors seems central here: the speaker 
could be just an ordinary man—or not; he could be an ancestor—or not; he could 
be a predator—or not; he could be human—or not. Such situation is necessary for 
the chief to occupy an intermediary position between ancestral chiefs and living 
people, between other peoples and their own, in order to become the mediator 
whom he is supposed to be. Clastres argued that chiefly discourses denied reci-
procity. However, as Marilyn Strathern (1992: 178) suggests, any exchange in gift 
economies enacts an exchange of perspectives: each person can only become a do-
nor or receptor by assuming the perspective of the other. I think there is something 
similar in the Kalapalo case. The chief anticipates his people’s point of view (as prey) 
and conceals his predatory nature, while his fellow villagers see each other as kin 
(and human) while collectively assuming the chief ’s point of view (recognizing his 
hidden nature). In this sense, the chief ’s speech is all about exchange, although not 
in Clastres’ sense.
I’ve mentioned that such discourses have fallen into disuse in the Upper Xingu. 
What could be the consequences of this? Obviously, there could be no measurable 
effects, but the Kalapalo have their theories. Some say that today there is more 
witchcraft than in the past; others say that people are becoming more egoistic and 
don’t share their food with just anyone; others are exchanging ritual decorations 
and festivals for Western clothes and music. Isn’t it precisely food, caring for rela-
tives, and feasts that the speeches are all about? These speeches reflect (and intend 
to act) upon the challenges of moving on in the face of the desegregating effects and 
transformations represented by witchcraft, enemies, and the dangerous spirits who 
are white people. Clastres was right: the chief ’s speech doesn’t demand or produce 
laws—but it has a great reflexive capacity, and that’s where it gains at least part of 
its force.
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Des chimères politiques: L’incertitude dans le discours du chef dans le 
Haut-Xingu
Résumé : Cet article s’intéresse aux formes de gouvernement rituelles dans le Sud 
de l’Amazonie, et en particulier au cas des “chefferies sans pouvoir”. A l’aide d’une 
analyse des arts oratoires rituels entre les chefs dans le système multi-ethnique et 
plurilingue du Haut-Xingu, il montre que les concepts de “condensation rituelle” et 
de “chimère” peuvent être utiles à la description et l’analyse de telles formes de gou-
vernement. Dans le Haut-Xingu, certains chefs maitrisent un registre appelé “lan-
gage des chefs”, qui consiste en un ensemble de discours conventionnels s’adressant 
aux chefs d’autres groupes ou à leur propre peuple, selon le contexte dans lequel ils 
sont prononcés. Cet article analyse des discours de ce registre parmi les Kalapalo 
(un peuple de cette région parlant une langue caribe) et montre que dans ce registre 
le chef et le peuple sont évoqués comme des sujets “paradoxaux” caractérisés par 
des prédicats contradictoires; il considère également comment cet état de fait se 
rattache à des idées Kalapalo au sujet de la parenté et du pouvoir. En utilisant les 
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concepts de “condensation rituelle” et de “chimère”, cet article propose de réou-
vrir le débat sur la rhétorique politique lancé par Pierre Clastres et de s’interroger 
sur la manière dont l’incertitude—plutôt que l’ “autorité” ou la “conviction”—peut 
enclencher un échange de perspectives, à travers lequel les identités du groupe et 
du chef peuvent être reproduites.
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